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Some Issues in Psychiatry, Psychology,
and the Law
RENEE L. BINDER* AND DALE E. McNIEL**
INTRODUCTION
In this Essay, we discuss some issues in psychiatry, psychology, and
the law with the goal of increasing understanding across disciplines. We
begin by describing differences in how psychiatry/psychology view
certain concepts versus how they are viewed by the legal system. We then
discuss special ethical issues that arise when a psychiatrist/psychologist is
acting as a consultant to a court of law as opposed to participating in a
treatment relationship. We also comment on the "Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual" which has been called the "bible of psychiatry."'
Finally, we consider research developments that bear on the courts'
considerations of psychiatric/psychological testimony on violence risk
assessment.
I. DIFFERENT CONCEPTS IN PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW
A. CERTAINTY VERSUS PROBABILITY
In the courts, psychiatrists and psychologists are often asked to
testify "within reasonable medical certainty" or "within medical
probability."' The legal system wants certainty. Attorneys and judges
want scientific facts and statistical projections, in part because the
resolution of disputes requires making absolute decisions such as: Is the
defendant guilty or not guilty? Should the plaintiff be compensated for
damages or not? In contrast, clinicians are less concerned about
certainty. They deal with probabilities: What is the likelihood that a
certain treatment will work for a certain illness? With the constellation of
* Professor of Psychiatry and Director of Psychiatry and the Law Program, ,School of Medicine,
University of California, San Francisco.
** Professor of Clinical Psychology and Chief Psychologist, Langley Porter Psychiatric Hospital
and Clinics, University of California, San Francisco.
I. See, e.g., Roger K. Blashfield, The Vulgate DSM-IV: A Review of Am I OK? A Layman's
Guide to the Psychiatrist's Bible, 189 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 3, 3-7 (2OOI).
2. THOMAS G. GUTHEIL & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
336 (3d ed. 2000); accord Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co., 980 P.2d 398,403 (Cal. 1999).
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presenting signs and symptoms, what is the likelihood that this represents
bipolar affective disorder or a substance-induced manic episode?
Clinicians may wind up finding that the signs and symptoms are related
to an uncommon illness with a low probability of occurrence and
causation of the symptoms. Clinicians are comfortable with this concept.
In contrast, opinions about low probability events are not helpful to the
legal system when decisions are being made about incarceration or about
compensation of plaintiffs. Courts want more certainty on these matters.
B. PURSUIT OF JUSTICE
A difference also exists in the legal and mental health systems
regarding their values about the pursuit of justice. Decisions about
psychological issues (e.g., civil commitment, insanity) made by courts
involve societal/moral judgments, not scientific ones. One of the ways
mental health professionals can assist the trier of fact is to present the
data relevant to the legal issue at hand, rather than leaping to the
ultimate issue. If the mental health professionals testify about ultimate
legal issues, they should make explicit the fact that such opinions are
value judgments and moral statements, and are not scientific
determinations.
This is exemplified during the civil commitment process for clients
who have serious mental illness. Clinicians are sometimes seen as trying
to help people at the expense of their liberty. They may be concerned
about whether or not the patient needs hospitalization and whether the
hospitalization will keep the patient safe from dangerous behaviors such
as suicidal or assaultive acts. Hospitalization may be seen as an
opportunity to initiate treatment which may ameliorate the signs and
symptoms of the illness. In contrast, the legal profession often is
concerned with advocacy for civil liberties and important legal principles
that will benefit society and not just an individual patient. The key issue
in a specific case may not be whether the patient meets the criteria for
involuntary hospitalization, but whether the legal process was carried out
appropriately, e.g., whether the forms for involuntary hospitalization
were completed accurately with appropriate signatures at the
appropriate time. We have been involved in civil commitment hearings
where the patient was released to the community because the nurse on-
call in the emergency room did not complete the necessary forms
appropriately. From the perspective of the legal system, this outcome
may be justifiable because each client is entitled to due process,3
including having forms completed accurately. From the perspective of
the clinician, the outcome may be seen as not justifiable because the
clinician wants the patient to receive necessary treatment whether or not
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, § i; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
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a particular form is filled out accurately.
The difference in values about justice can also be seen in whether
evidence is introduced where it is considered both probative and highly
prejudicial. In the medical care system, all evidence, including details
about prior problems, is considered relevant to understanding a patient
and to providing appropriate culturally-sensitive care.4 In the legal
system, information is excluded if it is considered unfairly prejudicial.'
Renee L. Binder was involved as an expert witness in two different cases
that illustrate this issue. In one case, a patient died while in a psychiatric
hospital and his mother was seeking damages for wrongful death and
pain and suffering for herself and his five-year-old son. Part of the
deceased's history included a long criminal record, including physical
attacks against his mother and physical abuse of his child. This
information was excluded from the courtroom as being unfairly
prejudicial. The psychiatrist felt that it was relevant in terms of
understanding the individual and also the pain and suffering of the
plaintiffs. The judge disagreed and this information was excluded.
In another case, a man was accidentally killed by a police officer
when he was raising a gun over his head, allegedly as part of a cultural
ritual. The police officers claimed that they asked him to stop and when
he did not, they shot him, and he died from his wounds. The widow
brought a lawsuit against the police department for wrongful death and
pain and suffering. Binder met with the widow and reviewed all of her
medical and psychiatric records. In the course of the evaluation, it was
revealed that the widow married the decedent's cousin one month after
the shooting and death of her first husband. From a mental health
perspective, this was relevant information to forming an opinion about
the pain and suffering that the plaintiff suffered. The judge disagreed.
The information was excluded from the courtroom because it was
considered overly prejudicial relative to its probative value.
Another example of differences in values about justice occurs when
evidence is suggestive of a certain etiology because of a pattern of
behavior. Such evidence is often excluded from the courtroom when
each item of the pattern has not been proven.' An example is where an
individual has had multiple problems in the workplace with multiple
supervisors, and always gives a different version of events than the
employer. An expert witness may opine that the fact that there were
repetitive alleged problems would likely suggest that the individual may
have been a problem employee. Attorneys could state, however, that the
4. See ILENE MOROF LUBKIN & PAMALA D. LARSEN, CHRONIC ILLNESS: IMPACT AND INTERVENTIONS
548-49 (2006).
5. FED. R. EVD. 403.
6. See FED. R. EvID. 404-06.
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facts of each individual incident were in question. Perhaps there were
multiple problem employers; perhaps this person was harassed in every
environment; perhaps he or she is the sort of person that is easily picked
on. Therefore, it could be argued that the fact that there is a pattern
without any of the specific incidents being proven should not be
considered evidence about whether or not the current event occurred.
Another example is seen when a patient comes into an emergency
room with signs and symptoms of opiate withdrawal. Even if the patient
has a negative toxicology screen, most emergency room physicians would
treat the patient for opiate withdrawal based on the signs and symptoms.
In the legal arena, when the question is raised about whether or not a
defendant used opiates, the fact of a negative toxicology screen for
opiates would make it unlikely that the defendant would be found to
have used opiates.
C. RELIABILITY VERSUS VALIDITY
Reliability and validity are two distinct concepts about which the law
should be aware. In medicine and social science, reliability refers to
reproducibility of results. A reliable measuring instrument returns
consistent measurements every time a test is done and different people
measuring the same variable will arrive at the same value.7 Validity refers
to accuracy.8 Do the findings accurately represent what is being
measured?
The difference between reliability and validity can be seen in the use
of practice guidelines developed by medical professional organizations
that delineate a consensus of experts concerning the best way of treating
a medical condition such as diabetes, hypertension, gastric ulcer,
schizophrenia, or bipolar disorder. The practice guidelines are reliable in
that different clinicians using them will arrive at similar diagnoses and
prescribe similar treatments. The question, however, is whether they are
valid. After three and a half years, only 90% remain current.9 Moreover,
after six years, fewer than 50% of practice guidelines remain accurate,
and the rest are outdated.'" Another example involves the use of rating
scales of self-reported symptoms such as those that are used to determine
whether or not an evaluee suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder.
Some of these scales do not include measures of response style or
validity, and depend on the assumption that the evaluee is giving an
7. JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 54-55
(4th ed. 1998).
8. Id.
9. Paul G. Shekelle et al., Validity of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Clinical
Practice Guidelines: How Quickly Do Guidelines Become Outdated?, 286 JAMA 1461, 1466 (2ooi).
to. Id. at 1467.
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accurate self-report." Such scales may be reliable in the sense that the
person reports the same symptoms each time that he or she fills out the
scale. However, such scales may not be valid for an individual, i.e., an
evaluee can state he or she has nightmares even if that is not really the
case.
Another difference between reliability and validity has to do with
individual versus group effects of medications or toxins. An example of
this is seen in the silicone breast implant litigation and the reported
development of connective tissue disease related to these implants."
Large studies of groups of women who had silicone breast implants
revealed that there was no difference in the development of connective
tissue disease between women who had the implants and a matched
control group of women who did not have the implants. 3 Nevertheless,
there may be validity to the fact that an individual woman who received
silicone breast implants could have developed an illness related to it.
The long-term effects of divorce and various custody arrangements
about which psychiatrists and psychologists may be asked to opine
demonstrate another difference between reliability and validity. It is
often difficult to give valid testimony about these many factors. Different
variables may interact for any one child or any single parent that affect
the impact of various custody arrangements. When mental health
professionals are asked to determine who is the best custodial parent,
one question is: What is the age of the child? In addition, because their
parenting is placed at issue, divorcing parents may be held to a higher
standard of parenting competence than nondivorcing parents. One of the
criteria that is often used to decide custody is to favor the parent who is
more likely to support the maintenance of the relationship of the child
with the non-custodial parent.'4 This is a legal standard. A psychological
question is: Is it really in the best interests of the child in every case?
Then there is the issue of percentage causality, and where is the
science that allows us to give an opinion about this? Expert witnesses are
often asked questions such as whether a sexual assault or sexual
harassment caused 20% or 8o% of a plaintiff's current psychiatric
picture. Did it cause 20% of the depression or 8o%? Did it cause 20% of
his or her inability to seek future employment or 8o%? What were the
other factors? Such precise estimates are often difficult to determine.
When attorneys ask expert witnesses to give opinions about these types
iI. See Mardi Horowitz et al., Impact of Event Scale: A Measure of Subjective Stress, 41
PYSCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE 209, 209-i8 (1979).
12. See Jorge Sinchez-Guerrero et al., Silicone Breast Implants and the Risk of Connective Tissue
Diseases and Symptoms, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. I666, i67o (1995).
13. Id.




of matters, the opinions may not be valid or reliable.
II. ETHICAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH FORENSIC EVALUATIONS
COMPARED TO PROVIDING TREATMENT
Psychiatrists and psychologists are expected to follow the general
ethical principles of their respective professional organizations.'5 Special
issues arise when their professional services are provided with the
intended purpose of applying their scientific, technical, or specialized
knowledge to the law and using that knowledge to assist in resolving
legal problems. Additional ethical duties arise in providing forensic
services beyond those that exist when psychiatrists and psychologists are
providing treatment.
When clinicians are engaged in a treatment relationship, several
principles apply. One of them is confidentiality. 6 What a patient says to a
treating clinician should be held in confidence. Treating clinicians also
engage in patient advocacy. The goal is to advocate for the best interest
of the patient. An additional principle is that treating clinicians rely on
narrative truth by the patient and use a patient's subjective view of
events to provide treatment. If a patient says that her mother was
emotionally abusive, the treating clinician does not say, "No, she wasn't.
I don't believe you. She seems like a very nice woman to me." The
important part of the treatment situation is that the treating clinician is
working with patients based on what patients tell the clinician about their
perception of what happened to them as a child or as an adult.
Different ethical issues arise when psychiatrists and psychologists
provide evaluations for the court. Forensic evaluators refer to the person
who is being evaluated as an evaluee or a defendant and not as their
patient. Forensic evaluators typically are retained by someone other than
the evaluee, such as the court or the attorney who requested the
evaluation. Forensic evaluators have an obligation to be objective, fair,
and impartial, regardless of whether or not that information helps the
legal case of the evaluee or the party that retained them. 7 Moreover,
forensic evaluators are not serving in the role of a patient advocate. A
forensic evaluator attempts to be impartial and fair and can advocate for
his or her opinion, but does not advocate for the patient. In addition,
15. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT
2 (2002) [hereinafter ETHICAL PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code2o2.pdf; ETHICS
COMM. OF THE AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, ETHICS PRIMER OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 81-
82 (2OO).
I6. See ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 7.
17. See generally AM. ACAD. FOR PSYCHOLOGY & THE LAW, ETHICS CODES OF AAPL COMMITTEE ON
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGISTS (i99i); see also AM. PSYCHOLOGY-LAw Soc'Y,
SPECIALTY GUIDELINES FOR FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY (Third Proposed Draft 2oo8), available at
http://www.ap-ls.org/links/228o8sgfp.pdf; Comm. on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists,
Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655 (1991).
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instead of relying on narrative truth, a forensic evaluator is expected to
be objective. There is a need for corroborating facts and evidence rather
than only relying on the self-report by the evaluee.
Because of the special issues that arise when psychiatrists and
psychologists provide consultations for the courts, in addition to the
general ethical principles of their professions, major professional
organizations concerned with forensic issues in psychiatry (American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law) and psychology (American
Psychology-Law Society) have developed guidelines that provide further
guidance to these professionals in monitoring the quality of their forensic
services.'8 These guidelines include topics such as the pursuit of justice;
truth telling and honesty; trying to distinguish between facts and
inferences; information that is verified versus unverified; specifying the
limits of confidentiality; paying special attention to potential conflicts of
interest of the examiner or biases of the examiner; not doing forensic
evaluations on a defendant before he or she has access to legal counsel;
taking cases within expertise; not accepting contingency fees; and
performing personal examinations before rendering an opinion or else
specifying the limitations of the opinions if the opinions are not based on
a personal evaluation.'9
Treating clinicians often can provide relevant testimony on topics
such as the patient's reported history, diagnosis, treatment provided, and
response to treatment. However, special problems can arise when a
treating clinician also provides testimony on legal issues, such as criminal
responsibility, legal causation, trial competency, and the relative merits
of parenting capacity. For example, if the treating clinician relies solely
on the patient's self report, this may provide insufficient foundation for
opinions about these legal questions. Advocacy associated with the
treating role can make it difficult for the treating clinician to be impartial
and objective. In addition, the forensic role may require testimony that
interferes with the treatment relationship (e.g., information about the
patient's diagnosis or functional status, or professional opinions that are
not favorable to the patient's legal case).
III. DSM-IV: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
The fourth edition text revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) ° is a resource used by attorneys
as well as by mental health professionals. It is important to understand its
I. See sources cited supra note 17.
19. See AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW, ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY 1-4 (2005). available at https://www.aapl.org/pdf/ETHICSGDLNS.pdf.
20. See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
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purpose and the fact that it is not a "bible."2' The DSM-IV is a consensus
document.2 Experts on a particular diagnosis are appointed to a
committee to develop a consensus about what the literature and the
research say about the criteria for a certain diagnosis. The revisions in
each updated edition of the manual are based on research and clinical
experience.23 The DSM-IV is useful for classification purposes for
insurance, research protocols, and treatment protocols. Thus, if an
insurance company will only pay for certain diagnoses, the question will
be whether an individual patient's symptoms meet those diagnostic
criteria. In addition, in terms of research and treatment protocols, it is
important that clinicians who are treating a patient or are doing studies
on patients in New York or in San Francisco are comparing their results
on similar patients who meet specified diagnostic criteria. The DSM-IV
is also a multi-axial assessment. It includes not only the primary
diagnosis, but it also includes personality disorders upon which the
primary diagnosis is superimposed, medical conditions, a list of stressors
in the patient's life, and a global assessment of functioning scale. The
DSM-IV defines a mental disorder as "a clinically significant behavioral
or psychological syndrome... that is associated with present distress or.
• .disability."24 The DSM-IV also is explicit about what is not a mental
disorder. "[A]n expectable and culturally sanctioned response to a
particular event" is not a mental disorder.5 Deviant behavior or conflicts
with society are also not classified as mental disorders, according to
DSM-IV, unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a mental
disorder as defined above. 6
In the Supreme Court decision of Atkins v. Virginia,7 which
considered the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on
defendants who are mentally retarded, Justice Stevens refers to the
DSM-IV, 8 and the joint amicus curiae brief of the American
Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association. 9
Justice Stevens stated, "clinical definitions of mental retardation require
not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant
limitations in adaptive skills.., that became manifest before age I8. "3 In
contrast, Justice Scalia, focusing on this definition in his dissent stated,
21. Andrew E. Taslitz, Mental Health and Criminal Justice: An Overview, 22 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5
(2007).
22. See DSM-IV, supra note 20, at xxxiii.
23. See id.
24. Id. at xxxi.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
28. Id. at 308 n.3.
29. Seeid. at316n.21.
30. Id. at 318.
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"the symptoms of this condition can readily be feigned."3' Thus, we see
that the DSM-IV was used by some of the Justices in their decision
making about whether there is a true diagnosis of mental retardation and
how it can be diagnosed in any one defendant. There is clearly
controversy about this issue among the Supreme Court Justices. It is
important to note that included in the DSM-IV is a cautionary statement
which says the "assignment of a particular diagnosis does not imply a
specific level of impairment or disability."3 Thus, an individual may be
depressed, but that may or may not result in a level of functional
impairment that warrants a determination of disability. Also, a diagnosis
does not imply a legal standard, for example, incompetence, disability, or
lack of criminal responsibility. A defendant may have a diagnosis of
schizophrenia, yet he or she may still be competent to stand trial. In
addition, a diagnosis does not imply whether a behavior can be
controlled. Thus, severe mania in an individual with bipolar disorder may
or may not affect whether the person can control his or her behavior.
The diagnosis does not tell whether a defendant charged with a crime
had an irresistible impulse or whether he had an impulse not resisted.
This distinction is one that courts must keep in mind.
IV. RESEARCH ABOUT VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT AND APPLICATION
TO LEGAL DETERMINATIONS
In the last two decades, there has been a significant amount of
scientific research about violence risk assessment. The legal system has
been interested in this research, because violence potential is relevant to
many legal decisions. For example, civil commitment criteria in most
states rely on a dangerousness standard. In California, for instance, one
of the criteria for emergency civil commitment is that, as a result of a
mental disorder, the individual is a danger to others.33 There has been
controversy about the scientific basis for mental health professionals'
judgments of dangerousness among persons with mental disorders.34
There has also been concern about the limitations of the ability of mental
health professionals to forecast future violence, and controversy about
whether and how mental disorder is related to violence risk.35 Studies
over the last twenty years have supported that:
(i) Although the proportion of violence in society that is
31. Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. DSM-IV, supra note 20, at xxxiii.
33. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 20O6).
34. Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 401, 410-11 (2001).
35. See, e.g., Richard A. Friedman, Violence and Mental Illness: How Strong Is the Link?, 355
NEw ENG. J. MED. 2064 (2006).
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attributable to persons with mental disorders is small, 6 persons
with severe mental disorders, particularly with co-occurring
substance related disorders are at a higher relative risk than
others.37
(2) For acutely mentally ill persons who are eligible for emergency
civil commitment, symptoms of mental disorder increase the
short-term risk of violence."
(3) Clinical judgments of violence potential made by mental health
professionals in the context of emergency civil commitment are
associated with the risk of later violence, although the
predictive validity of their risk assessments is far from perfect.
(4) Research has validated a number of decision support tools that
can enhance assessments of the risk of future violence by
people with mental disorder, by grounding them in variables
that are empirically associated with the probability of future
violent acts.4°
(5) Recent research suggests that when trained in the new
methods, the ability of clinicians to make scientifically-based
risk assessments for violence improves.'
Although these advances have the potential to improve the validity
of mental health professionals' assessments of patients' risk for violence,
decisions about how much risk is necessary to justify decisions about
deprivation of liberty through civil commitment remain value judgments
that are not scientific. For example, some individuals who clinicians have
determined have a high likelihood of violence, will not actually commit
36. Id. at 2065.
37. See Seena Fazel & Martin Grann, The Population Impact of Severe Mental Illness on Violent
Crime, 163 AMER. J. PSYCHIATRY, 1397, 1401 (2006).
38. See Dale E. McNiel, Jane P. Eisner & Renee L. Binder, The Relationship Between Aggressive
Attributional Style and Violence by Psychiatric Patients, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 399,
401 (2O03); see also Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, The Relationship Between Acute Psychiatric
Symptoms, Diagnosis, and Short-Term Risk of Violence, 45 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 133, 136 (1994);
Dale E. McNiel, Jane P. Eisner & Renee L. Binder, The Relationship Between Command
Hallucinations and Violence, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1288, 1288 (2000).
39. See Dale E. McNiel, Judy N. Lam & Renee L. Binder, Relevance of Interrater Agreement to
Violence Risk Assessment, 68 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. I I I I, I 113-14 (2O00); see also Dale
E. McNiel, David A. Sandberg & Renee L. Binder, The Relationship Between Confidence and
Accuracy in Clinical Assessment of Psychiatric Patients' Risk of Violence, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 664
(1998); John Monahan, Tarasoff at Thirty: How Developments in Science and Policy Shape the
Common Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 497, 500-0I (2006).
40. See Dale E. McNiel et al., Utility of Decision Support Tools for Assessing Acute Risk of
Violence, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 945, 948 (2003); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of
Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391,
408-13 (2006).
41. See Dale E. McNiel et al., Impact of Clinical Training on Violence Risk Assessment, 165 AMER.
J. PSYCHIATRY 195, 195 (2008).
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violence. The legal system needs to decide how much likelihood of future
violence is necessary to deprive an individual of civil liberties through
civil commitment. We expect that clinicians' testimony based on
scientifically valid data about violence risk will assist legal professionals
in making such decisions.
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